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BLD-094        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-3083 
___________ 
 
DANA E. YOUNG, SR., 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COUNSELOR HAWK; PAM TOMKO;  
PRISONER LITIGATION SETTLEMENT PROGRAM,  
PLSP AG and DOC Contacts 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-13-cv-02232) 
District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones III 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 18, 2018 
 
Before:  RESTREPO, BIBAS and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 23, 2018) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Dana E. Young, Sr., appeals from an order of the United States District Court for 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which entered summary judgment in favor of the 
Defendants in his civil rights action.  Because no substantial question is presented by the 
appeal, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See Third Circuit LAR 
27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
 In 1983, a Lehigh County jury found Young guilty of twenty-three separate 
counts, including rape, two counts of kidnapping, indecent assault, and indecent 
exposure.  He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of twenty-one to forty-two years.  
Young first became eligible for parole in 2004, but he has been denied parole on at least 
five occasions, with each decision “citing failure to participate in sex offender program.”  
Am. Compl., Dkt. #27, at 3.  Young filed the civil rights complaint at issue here in 2013, 
claiming that certain prison officials violated his due process rights by failing to ensure 
that his prison file reflected the fact that he had completed the Structured Treatment 
Education Program (“STEP”) while housed at the State Correctional Institution at 
Huntingdon.  The STEP program was a program for sex offenders that did not include an 
admission of guilt.  Declaration of Kenneth Ley, Dkt. #54 at ¶11; Plaintiff’s Statement of 
Material Facts, Dkt. #59 at ¶22.  Young alleged in his complaint that this omission 
caused his parole denials. 
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 After the District Court dismissed the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections as defendants,1 the remaining defendants2 filed 
a motion for summary judgment.  They argued that Young could not prevail on his due 
process claim because he could not establish that parole decision makers would rely to a 
constitutionally significant degree on the information missing from Young’s prison file--
they argued that Young would not be recommended for parole unless he completed a sex 
offender program that included an “admitter’s” component.  They also argued that 
Young’s claim was barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. 
 The District Court granted the motion for summary judgment, agreeing that Young 
had failed to establish that the absent documents would be relied upon to a 
constitutionally significant degree.3  Young timely appealed. 
 We review the District Court’s order granting summary judgment de novo and 
review the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of 
Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2011).  We will affirm if our review reveals that “there 
                                              
1 Young does not challenge this decision. 
 
2 Young’s amended complaint named two Department of Corrections employees 
(counselor James Hawk and psychologist Pam Tomko) as defendants. 
 
3 The District Court did not discuss the timeliness of Young’s complaint, and we will not 
rest our decision on that basis.  But as the Defendants argued below, it appears that 
Young has known since at least 2003 that he was being denied parole for failure to 
complete sex offender treatment.  It thus appears that his complaint (filed in 2013) was 
filed well beyond the two-year period of limitations.  See Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 
152, 157 (3d Cir. 2017) (“The statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims in 
Pennsylvania is two years.”). 
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is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  We may affirm the District Court’s judgment on 
any basis that the record supports.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 
2011) (per curiam).   
 In Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 783 (3d Cir. 2010), we posited that 
Pennsylvania state law entitles a prisoner to have his parole application “fairly 
considered.”  The parties here agree that documentation indicating that Young completed 
the STEP program is missing from his prison file.  But the missing information did not 
prevent Young from having his application “fairly considered.”  As Young concedes, 
because the STEP program did not contain an admitter’s requirement, it would not fulfill 
a requirement that he complete sex offender programming with an admitter’s 
requirement.  See Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts, Dkt. #59 at ¶22, 25-26, 28.  As 
inclusion of the information would make no difference in the parole decision, we 
conclude that Young’s procedural due process claim fails.4 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.     
 
                                              
4 Although he does not raise the issue here, Young seemed to suggest in his Statement of 
Material Facts that imposition of the requirement that he complete programming that 
includes an admitter’s component would be an impermissibly retroactive increase in his 
punishment.  But we rejected an identical argument in Newman.  See Newman, 617 F.3d 
at 786 (imposition of sex offender treatment with admitter’s component served 
“legitimate penological objective” of rehabilitation and did not constitute increased 
punishment). 
